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JUST COMPENSATION AND THE NAVIGATION POWER
WILLILAM J. POWELL
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution commands
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Many cases involve the issue of what constitutes just
compensation for particular private property which has been taken.
Few guiding principles have been formulated, other than a general
proposition that just compensation is based upon the market value of
the property with due consideration of all its available uses.' The
amount assessed under the above formula cannot be enhanced by any
special use of the property to the Government, because just compensa-
tion means the amount of loss to the owner, not the gain derived by the
appropriator from the taking.2 The purpose of this comment is to out-
line a major exception to the usual rules of just compensation.
Where the United States appropriates private property in execution
of its navigation power, the determination of just compensation pro-
ceeds upon a unique theory. Special rules have been formulated for the
determination of what is private property as against the United States
in and along navigable waterways, and, as shall be pointed out, these
rules have a tremendous effect upon the amount of compensation due
when the Government "takes" such property. The primary determina-
tion is one of property rights. It is self-evident that all property rights
possessed by the United States cannot be private property, and that
the exercise of these rights does not involve loss to any private owner.
The United States may "take" private property in at least three
different ways. First, it may employ legal means of condemnation. As
an instrument for implementing the necessary and proper clause of the
Constitution,' the United States possesses the power of eminent domain.
The power was early recognized as an incident of sovereignty,4 and
later recognized as impliedly authorized by the fifth amendment.'
Second, it occasionally seizes private property outright, usually in war-
time operation of industries or appropriation of enemy assets.' Third,
1 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
2 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The congress shall have power: ... 17. To make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers,....
4 Mayor, Alderman & Inhabitants of New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662
(U.S. 1823).
1 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
0 International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931) (compensation
required for seizure under "war power").
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a "taking" may result as an incident or effect of Government action,
such as flooding of lands by waters impounded by a Government dam.
In each case, the question of just compensation may arise, the amount
of which will be measured by the loss to the owner. The loss may be far
less if the appropriation of the land should be taken in exercise of the
Government's navigation power.
THE NAVIGATION POWER
In 1824, the case of Gibbons v. Ogden7 established that the com-
merce power encompasses the field of navigation. The Federal Consti-
tution' delegates the commerce power to Congress, whose judgment
determines whether a particular thing is in aid of or an obstruction to
navigation. This has generally been accepted by the Supreme Court
since the Belmont Bridge cases. In the first Belmont case,' the Supreme
Court found that a bridge across the Ohio River was a nuisance and an
obstruction to navigation. Its maintenance at the then present level was
enjoined. Congress thereupon passed an act declaring the bridge to be
a lawful structure, making it a post-road and requiring ship owners to
regulate their vessels so as not to interfere with the present level of the
bridge. Congressional discretion in this matter was upheld in a con-
tempt action brought for failure to obey the Court's injunction.'" The
Court held that though the bridge may still be an obstruction to navi-
gation in fact, it was not so in the contemplation of law. Since that
time, congressional determination of what is improvement of navigation
has seldom been challenged successfully.
In exercise of the commerce power "to improve navigation", Con-
gress may extend the areas of practicable navigation either by con-
structing channels for actual use, removing obstructions to navigation,
or by improving and enlarging the navigability of already navigable
waters.1" It may block navigation at one place for the purpose of
fostering it at another,' and as an incident thereto may engage the
Government in various proprietary enterprises such as the production
of electric power."
7 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824).
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The congress shall have power: ... 3. To regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
9 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518 (U.S. 1852).
10 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (U.S. 1856).
E1 United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
"2 South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876).
-United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913);
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); United States v. Appalachian Electric




In some cases the Court has felt it sufficient to state that the United
States, in appropriating land for public use in the exercise of its power
to improve navigation, is liable under the fifth amendment to make just
compensation therefor. 4 These statements are accurate but incom-
plete. The primary problem remaining is to determine the extent of
the private property which has been taken, because only private prop-
erty rights are compensable. One method utilized is to examine the
other side of the coin and thereby find the extent of Government
property rights. The value of the remainder is then assessed as full
compensation for the exact amount of private property which has been
taken for public use. This method employs the concept of "navigation
servitude", which is a relatively modern theory developed by the
Supreme Court. Earlier cases assumed that private ownership was
subject to some public right of navigation." Modernly, the Court
speaks in terms of the navigation servitude:
It is not the broad constitutional power to regulate commerce, but
rather the servitude derived from that power and narrower in scope, that
frees the Government from liability in these cases. When the Government
exercises this servitude, it is exercising its paramount power in the inter-
est of navigation, rather than taking the private property of anyone. The
owner's use of property riparian to a navigable stream long has been lim-
ited by the right of the public to use the stream in the interest of naviga-
tion.... This has applied to the stream and to the land submerged by the
stream. There thus has been ample notice over the years that such prop-
erty is subject to a dominant public interest. This right of the public has
crystallized in terms of a servitude over the bed of the stream ...
Accordingly, it is consistent with the history and reason of the rule to
deny compensation where the claimant's private title is burdened with
this servitude but to award compensation where his title is not so bur-
dened.'6 (emphasis supplied)
In another case the servitude is described in these terms:
The dominant power of the federal government, as has been repeatedly
held, extends to the entire bed of the stream, which includes the lands
below ordinary high-water mark. The exercise of the power within
these limits is not an invasion of any private property right in such lands
for which the United States must make compensation. The damage sus-
'-'United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); United States v. Williams, 188
U.S. 485 (1903).
16 Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 276 (1897): "... riparian ownership is
subject to the obligation to suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation
in the exercise of the dominant right of the Government in that regard."




tained results not from a taking of the riparian owner's property in the
stream bed, but from the lawful exercise of a power to which that prop-
erty has always been subject.'7 (emphasis supplied)
A line of cases which arose prior to and overlapped into the servitude
era applied a different test. If the injury complained of was a "direct"
result of Government action, compensation was granted; 8 but if it
was merely "consequential" as an indirect result of some public work,
compensation was denied. 9 In the latter case there was only a tortious
act doing injury, and there was no tort remedy against the United
States." Since the Federal Tort Claims Act"' this analysis has become
largely obsolete, and recent cases allow recovery for "indirect" injuries
where the claimant's title is not burdened by the navigation servitude.2 '
Whether the taking for the improvement of navigation is by eminent
domain, by outright seizure, or is tortious, the servitude analysis pro-
vides a consistent measure of compensation. To show an injury, which
will be compensated, the claimant must prove that he possesses prop-
erty rights which are not burdened by the servitude. "Such economic
uses are rights only when they are legally protected interests."'"
Interests subject to the navigation servitude are not legally protected.
Whether the state or private persons own the bed of the stream, 4 or
whether certain interests in navigable waterways are legally protected
interests under state law are evidently immaterial, for the United States'
17 United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 596-597 (1941).ig Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 13 Wall. 166 (U.S. 1872).
19 Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897) ; Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S.
217 (1904) ; Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1 (1913) ; Sanguinetti v. United States,
264 U.S. 146 (1924).
20 Federal dikes in the Mississippi River diverted the current against the opposite
shore, washing away plaintiff's land within a year. This was held not to be a taking,
that plaintiff's cause of action, if any, was in tort, and the United States was immune
from tort liability. The facts were distinguished from a flooding, which evidently was
considered a direct taking. Franklin v. United States, 101 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1939),
aff'd, 308 U.S. 516 (1939). Cf. WASH. CONST. amend. IV: "No private property shall
be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first
been made,..." (italics added.)
2128 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1947). There may still be some injuries which are neither
a taking nor a tort. The Government built a system of levees which had gaps or
"fuse plugs" so that the plaintiff's land, in the path of a fuse plug, was still as subject
to floods as it had been before the Government project. It was held that plaintiff's land
had not been taken. This would probably not be a tort, either. United States v.
Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939).
22 United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
23 Mr. Justice Jackson in United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
503 (1945).
24 E.g., WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1: "The State of Washington asserts its owner-
ship to the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and including the
line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and




navigation servitude is paramount to all other interests." Thus the
compensation due from the Government may be measured differently
than when the appropriation is made by a state or by a public utility."0
It should be noted here that the servitude is only considered in cases
where Congress is exercising its navigation power. Appropriation under
any other power or under the Reclamation Act calls for compensation
under usual rules without regard to the servitude.28 Where the naviga-
tion power is exercised, the proper measure of compensation should be
the fair market value of the property as subject to the navigation servi-
tude. However, some difficulty remains in the determination of exactly
what the servitude includes. It is ordinarily said to include the waters
themselves and the lands beneath and within the high-water mark of
navigable streams.2 For the purpose of defining the extent of the servi-
tude, the cases have been classified according to the physical location
of the "property" which is appropriated or injured.
WITHIN, UNDER OR OVER THE STREAM
Where private structures or property are located in a navigable
waterway itself, upon land below the waters or over the waters, the
25 "Rights, property or otherwise, which are absolute against all the world are
certainly rare, and water rights are not among them. Whatever rights may be as
between equals such as riparian owners, they are not the measure of riparian rights on
a navigable stream relative to the functioning of the Government in improving naviga-
tion. Where these interests conflict they are not to be reconciled as between equals,
but the private interest must give way to a superior right, or perhaps it would be more
accurate to say that as against the Government such private interest is not a right at
all." Mr. Justice Jackson in United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
510 (1945).
"X In Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 335 U.S. 359 (1948), a con-
demnee was allowed full power-site value for an appropriation by a private utility. The
Court stated that if either the United States or its licensee under the Federal Power
Act were seeking the land, different considerations would arise. In a strong dissent,
Mr. Justice Douglas said: "The result of this decision is to give the water-power value
of the current of the river to a private party who by reason of federal law neither
has nor can acquire any lawful claim to it." 335 U.S. 359, 375. Note the consistency of
this position in the Twin City and Niagara cases, notes 65 and 71, infra. Cases con-
struing liability of a city for damage in improvement of navigation: Yates v.
Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497 (U.S. 1870) (city liable for removal of wharf in widening
channel) ; but see Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1877) (city not liable for filling in
plaintiff's shorelands and erecting wharves). In Hewitt-Lea Lumber Co. v. King
County, 113 Wash. 431, 194 Pac. 377 (1920), the county was required to compensate for
destruction of plaintiff's use of Lake Washington caused by a lowering of the lake
level by construction of a ship canal.
-743 U.S.C. §§ 371-609 (1952). 32 STAT. 390 (1902), 43 U.S.C. 381 (1952)
expressly preserves water rights under state laws.
;- International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931) (compensation
required for Government appropriation of water rights under "war power") ; United
States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (requiring compensation for
riparian rights appropriated under the Reclamation Act).
110 United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941); "The
relevance of the high-water level of the navigable stream is that it marks its bed."
United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950).
1956]
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United States may appropriate or destroy it in the improvement of
navigation without any payment of compensation. Thus, in Lewis Blue
Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs,"0 the Government dredged the
bottom of a navigable bay, thereby destroying plaintiff's oyster planta-
tion. No compensation was required, since plaintiff operated his oyster
plantation subject to the navigation servitude." Likewise, other cases
have denied compensation where the Government either destroyed or
required removal of wharves or other structures which reached into
navigable waters, and of bridges which cross them.32 When the Gov-
ernment is exercising its navigation power, the servitude is so absolute
within, under and over the navigable water that a corollary rule is
enunciated in some cases: if the Government is free from liability, it is
immaterial that a structure affected constitutes no hindrance or obstruc-
tion to, or interference with, actual navigation." Entire power dams
within a navigable stream have been appropriated without compensa-
tion. 4 It is amply demonstrated that one takes a calculated risk when
he places structures within, under or over a navigable stream.
THE LIMIT OF THE SERVITUDE - NON-NAVIGABLE TRIBUTARIES
Though structures within a navigable stream may be taken or de-
stroyed with impunity, the Supreme Court has refused to burden
structures within non-navigable tributaries, or land riparian thereto.
In United States v. Cress,"3 compensation was required where Govern-
ment dams and locks upon a navigable stream so diminished the current
of an upstream non-navigable tributary that plaintiff, a riparian owner
upon the tributary, had too little power left to run his mill. In another
case, 6 a Government dam maintained the Mississippi River at its ordi-
nary high-water mark. This caused a waterlogging of plaintiff's land,
situated one and one-half miles from the river and riparian to a non-
navigable tributary. Plaintiff was awarded compensation for the de-
struction of the agricultural value of its land. The Court clearly held
30 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
31 The result of this case has now been changed by statute: 28 U.S.C. § 1497
(1948).
12)Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson,
223 U.S. 605 (1912) ; Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915) ;
Willink v. United States, 240 U.S. 572 (1916); Louisville Bridge Co. v. United
States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917) ; United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
33 Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915) ; United States
v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
34 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
35243 U.S. 316 (1917).
36 United States v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
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that his title was not burdened with the navigation servitude since it
was riparian to a non-navigable stream.
In United States v. Willow River Power Co.," slightly different facts
produced an opposite result. There, a non-navigable tributary ran for
some distance closely parallel to a navigable stream. Plaintiff had
diverted the entire flow of the tributary through a new channel and into
the navigable river, using the diversion to produce power from an arti-
ficially created drop. A Government dam downstream raised the level
of the navigable river substantially above its ordinary high-water mark,
thereby diminishing plaintiff's power head. Plaintiff sought compensa-
tion for loss of power value. The Court held that a riparian owner has
no right of run-off into a navigable stream as against the navigation
servitude. The Cress case was distinguished in that it had involved a
right of run-off into a non-navigable tributary, not into the navigable
stream itself. It is submitted that such a distinction is difficult to
justify. If, by reason of the servitude, the Government may maintain
the navigable stream at ordinary high-water mark, its servitude should
also burden all lands affected thereby. In the Cress case the the run-off
was ultimately into the navigable stream, though proximately into the
tributary. It would appear that maintenance of ordinary high-water
level is merely the exercise of the servitude as to all the world, and that
the Kansas City case"5 is not as consistent with the servitude theory as
it might be. But the rule from all three cases is reasonably clear: the
navigation servitude does not burden lands which are not riparian to
navigable streams." It is fair conjecture whether this rule may be
qualified by the Twin City case, discussed below.
LAms RiPARAN To NAVIGABLE STREAms
Under the common law of most states, certain riparian rights are
incident to ownership of land abutting on navigable streams." Perhaps
one of the more valuable riparian rights is that of access to the stream,
for without access the riparian land has no special quality except
37 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
38 See note 36, supra.
29 It should be noted that § 23 of the Federal Power Act, 41 STAT. 1075 (1920),
16 U.S.C. § 817 (1952) provides that an FPC license is necessary for a riparian owner
upon a non-navigable stream to construct a power project. Congressional power of
flood control extends to non-navigable tributaries of navigable streams, State of
Oklahoma cx rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
40 See Comment, 3 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 33 (1953). For the state of riparian rights
on navigable waterways in Washington, see Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26
Pac. 539 (1891) ; State cx rel. Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie v. Superior Court, 70 Wash.




scenery. Yet, in the improvement of navigation, the United States may
deprive a riparian owner of access to a navigable stream without
liability for compensation.41 This being true, the navigation servitude
is not limited to the actual area within ordinary high-water mark, but
also burdens some of the riparian rights which are an incident of owner-
ship, and which make up much of the value of riparian land. As against
the servitude there is no right to a continued flow of the stream at the
same level,42 nor is there any right to use the water itself or its flow as
water power." Such rights, even if inviolate under state law, are not
"legally protected interests" as against the United States, and no
compensation is due for taking them.
Lands riparian to navigable streams are known as "fast lands", and
the Supreme Court has said that compensation must be paid for their
taking.44 Since riparian rights may constitute much of the "value" of
fast lands, and since just compensation is determined with reference to
the servitude in these cases, riparian rights which are burdened by the
servitude have no "value" which is compensable. Few cases have
considered the question of the measure of compensation due for fast
lands appropriated in improvement of navigation.
In Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States," the Government
condemned a dam and lock in a navigable river, and apparently volun-
tarily paid for the dam and lock. The appeal involved an asserted right
to compensation for the value of Monogahela's state franchise, which
the Court held compensable. There was no intimation in the case of a
servitude theory; the opinion indicated a view that the navigation
power was merely a superior right of condemnation. The Court subse-
quently expressed the view that Monogakela was based upon estoppel,
since the company had been operating under a federal license." In
light of the other cases discussed herein it would appear that Monoga-
hela has been overruled many times by implication.
The principal case prior to 1956 was United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co." Chandler-Dunbar operated a dam and
some locks in and along a navigable stream, and owned certain fast
41 Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897) ; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S.
141 (1900) ; United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926);
United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
42 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
43 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913);
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1941).
44United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).45 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
46 Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915).
47229 U.S. 53 (1913).
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lands adjacent thereto. The Government condemned the entire prop-
erty, and the principal issue before the Court was the valuation of the
fast lands. Compensation was denied for any value in certain of the
fast lands for use as factory sites in consequence of their availability
in connection with proposed water-power development, since this value
was viewed as being derived from the water power, thus subject to the
navigation servitude. This part of the case clearly follows the servitude
analysis, since any such value was dependent upon use of the flow of
the stream, a use which was subject to the servitude. But the Court
allowed compensation for other fast lands based upon their value based
on their availability for lock and canal purposes. The explanation for
this seemingly inconsistent holding was:
That this land had a prospective value for the purpose of constructing a
canal and lock parallel with those in use had passed beyond the region of
the purely conjectural or speculative. That one or more additional par-
allel canals and locks would be needed to meet the increasing demands of
lake traffic was an immediate probability. This land was the only land
available for the purpose. It included all the land between the canals in
use and the bank of the river. Although it is not proper to estimate land
condemned for public purposes by the public necessities or its worth to
the public for such a purpose it is proper to consider the fact that the
property is so situated that it will probably be desired and available for
such a purpose.4 S
Since locks and canals would require use of the water itself just as
would the production of power, the latter holding of the Chandler-
Dunbar case cannot, like the first issue, be reconciled with the servitude
theory. The implication of the language above quoted is that the two
parts of the case may be reconciled upon another ground: that not-
withstanding the servitude, compensation is payable for fast land value
due to an immediately prospective use, whereas the servitude denies
compensation for value due to a remote or conjectural use of the water
in the stream. This rule was applied in United States ex rel. TVA v.
Powelson" where all the land condemned lay along a non-navigable
stream. Without relying upon Chandler-Dunbar, the Court held that
the condemnee was not entitled to compensation for any value based
upon a planned four dam power project, since it had not acquired all
the necessary land, probably could not do so, and thus the project was
too remote. The Court refused to take into consideration the con-
demnee's state-granted power of eminent domain as making the
8 Id. at 76.40319 U.S. 266 (1942).
1956]
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projected use less remote. As has been illustrated above, the naviga-
tion servitude does not burden non-navigable streams or lands riparian
thereto, so it was not considered in the Powelson case. Thus the issue
was properly that of the usual condemnation case, whether such use
was too conjectural to attach any value to the land taken.
The ninth circuit produced two cases which closely follow Chandler-
Dunbar. In Continental Land Co. v. United States,50the issue was the
amount of compensation due for fast lands which formed the site for
Grand Coulee Dam. The court relied upon Chandler-Dunbar, stating
that no value could attach to the fast lands due to use of the stream. It
was also pointed out that no reasonable probability existed that private
capital would or could buy or utilize the damsite; therefore, such a use
was remote and unlikely, there being no market for the land as a dam-
site. Since the land consisted of two granite cliffs, its value for "just
compensation" was undoubtedly nominal, though in the hands of the
Government it constituted one of the finest damsites in the world. The
use to the condemnor is not a factor in assessing just compensation; the
measure is the loss to the owner."- In Washington Water Power Co. v.
United States," the power company had expended over $400,000 in
acquiring, surveying and planning use of certain fast lands at Kettle
Falls on the Columbia River as a power site. The United States paid
a condemnation price of $7,000, since the court excluded evidence of
value as a power site in reliance upon the Continental case. Again, the
prospective use was quite remote, since the contemplated project would
have flooded certain Government lands including part of an Indian
reservation. The company had no power to acquire those lands. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in each of these ninth circuit cases&
Both, however, are thoroughly consistent with Chandler-Dunbar upon
either servitude or remote use grounds.
The question remained open whether compensation was payable by
the United States for the value of fast land as a power site where such
use was immediately prospective, and where there was a present market
value of such land for such use. This issue was settled rather sur-
prisingly in 1956, in United States v. Twin City Power Co." In 1901,
Twin City began to acquire certain fast lands along the Savannah River
for the purpose of eventual development of a hydro-electric project.
50 88 F2d 104 (9th Cir. 1937).
51 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
5241 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Wash. 1941), aff'd, 135 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1943).
5 Continental Land Co., v. United States, 302 U.S. 715 (1937) ; Washington Water
Power Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 747 (1943).
5 76 Sup. Ct. 259 (1956).
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The Savannah River is navigable and forms the boundary between
Georgia and South Carolina. By 1919, some six Acts of Congress had
authorized Twin City to build the contemplated project. In 1925 Twin
City obtained a preliminary permit from the Federal Power Commis-
sion. Contention developed between Twin City and a rival utility as to
which would build the project.5 Finally in 1944, no project having
been built and no permit issued to authorize it, Congress authorized
the Clark Hill project, by which the federal government would develop
the site as part of a comprehensive navigation and flood control pro-
gram. The United States thereupon brought condemnation proceedings
to acquire Twin City's properties. Since the lands were situate in two
states, multiple litigation was necessary.
In the first reported case,"0 just compensation was held to include the
value of the fast lands as a site for potential power development:
To hold that the Government by the act of taking, strips this land of all
such value, which it had heretofore possessed, but that immediately after
the taking, it reacquired such value in the hands of the Government, con-
foms neither to logic nor justice.57
The "logic" and "justice" of the court failed to recognize the existence
of the well-established navigation servitude. The precise question to be
decided was what the court assumed: whether the land had ever pos-
sessed such value as against the United States. 8
In the second case in the district court,"0 more indication was given
of the method of evaluation used. Three engineers, testifying before
court commissioners, gave the sums of $1,500,000, $1,600,000 and
$1,900,000 respectively as the amounts which a prudent buyer would
pay a prudent seller for these fast lands. The commissioners fixed the
award at $1,257,033.20. The court approved this amount, saying:
The report, construed in its entirety, is a finding that $1,257,033.20 is
the fair market value of all the Twin City holdings, taking into consider-
ation all the factors of value, including their potential use for hydro-
electric purposes... Since the award to Twin City is not the value of its
properties for any particular purpose but represents its fair market value
after considering all of the reasonable uses of the property which were
not too remote or speculative, this amount is the "just compensation"
required by the Fifth Amendment.. 60 (emphasis supplied)
Or See Twin City Power Co. v. Savannah R. Electric Co., 163 S.C. 438, 161 S.E.
750 (1930) ; discussed in Note, 18 VA. L. REv. 307 (1932) ; Savannah River Electric
Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 164 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1947).56 United States v. 1532.63 Acres of Land, 86 F. Supp. 467 (W.D.S.C. 1949).
67 Id. at 469.
51 See note 25, supra.
1; United States v. 3928.09 Acres of Land, 114 F. Supp. 719 (W.D.S.C. 1953).
0 Id. at 724-725.
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The Government had argued alternatively that no compensation was
due for power site value due to the navigation servitude, and even if
there should be, the project was too remote since the Federal Power
Commission had not intended to license Twin City since 1928. The
court answered this contention by pointing out that there had been two
prospective purchasers from Twin City, the rival utility and the United
States. Any consideration of value from the prospect of federal appro-
priation is clearly wrong. Just compensation means loss to the owner,
not the gain to the appropriator. 1 A better answer would have been
that Twin City was ready, willing and able to develop the power site,
had the Government so authorized. The project was therefore, immedi-
ately prospective, and not remote.
At this point the Government commenced its appeals, contending
that it should pay only for the value of the land for timber and agricul-
tural uses plus an allowance for assembly of title under a single owner-
ship. Valuation of the land for these uses by the commissioners
amounted to $150,841.85, a difference of $1,106,191.35 from the com-
pensation awarded in the district court.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the award, saying:
We do not think that, because the availability of the land for water power
purposes arises from the fact that it is appurtenant to a navigable stream,
such availability should be ignored in appraising value for purposes of
condemnation. What is being taken is, not the flow of the stream or the
bed of the stream, but adjoining land which is being taken to form the
basin of a reservoir; and if its present availability for such use adds to its
market value, there is no reason why this must not be taken into con-
sideration in determining the compensation to be paid the owner....
It [the Government] is taking, not the bed of the stream, but lands
adjacent to the stream and is taking them, not for the purpose of naviga-
tion, but for the primary purposes of flood control and the development
of power.62 (emphasis supplied)
The latter distinction clearly violates the well-established rule of judi-
cial reluctance to question congressional determination that the project
was for the purpose of improving navigation."3 A duplicate appeal to
the Fifth Circuit"4 brought a like holding for substantially the same
reasons. Both circuits expressed disapproval of the Continental and
O1 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) ; Olson
v. United States, 292 U.S. 256 (1935) ; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943)
see notes 1, 2 and 51, supra.62 United States v. Twin City Power Co., 215 F2d 592, 596, 597 (4th Cir. 1954).
63 See notes 9, 10 and 33, supra. For a similar criticism of the case see Note, 8
ALA. L. REv. 145 (1955).
64 United States v. Twin City Power Co., 221 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1955); for a
criticism of this case see Note, 1 VIIL. L. REv. 167 (1956).
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Washington Water Power cases, and purported to follow Chandler-
Dunbar.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court ordered reversal of the awards for
power site value. In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas, five
members of the Court clearly held that power site value was encom-
passed by the navigation servitude:
An effort is made by this argument to establish that this private land is
not burdened with the Government's servitude. The flaw in that reason-
ing is that the landowner here seeks a value in the flow of the stream, a
value that inheres in the Government's servitude and one that under our
decisions the Government can grant or withhold as it chooses. It is no
answer to say that payment is sought only for the location value of the
fast lands. That special location value is due to the flow of the stream;
and if the United States were required to pay the judgments below, it
would be compensating the landowner for the increment of value added
to the fast lands if the flow of the stream were taken into account .... It
is no answer to say that these private owners had interests in the water
that were recognized by state law. We deal here with the federal domain,
an area which Congress can completely pre-empt, leaving no vested
private claims that constitute "private property" within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment. . . . If the owner of the fast lands can demand
water-power as part of his compensation, he gets the value of a right
that the Government in the exercise of its dominant servitude can grant
or withold as it chooses. The right has value or is an empty one depend-
ent solely on the Government. What the Government can grant or
withold and exploit for its own benefit has a value that is peculiar to it
and that no other user enjoys .... To require the United States to pay
for this water-power value would be to create private claims in the public
domain. 5
The majority states that Chandler-Dunbar is controlling. Considering
that case, the following language from the Twin City case is of interest:
*.. The location of the land was not determinative. It was the dominion
of the Government over the water power that controlled the decision.
Both in Chandler-Dunbar and in this case it is the water power that
creates the special value, whether the lands are above or below ordinary
high water."0 (emphasis supplied)
Here is the first clear statement by the Court that the burden of the
navigation servitude runs beyond the physical point of ordinary high
05 United States v. Twin City Power Co., -U.S.-, 76 Sup. Ct. 259, 261-263
(1956).
c13 Id. at 262. Cf. Mr. Justice Jackson's statement in United States v. Willow River
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509 (1945) : "This Court then [in Chandler-Dunbar] took a
view quite in line with the trend of former decisions there reviewed, that a strategic
position for the development of power does not give rise to right to maintain it as




water. The locks and canals award made in Chandler-Dunbar is not
mentioned by the majority, though it is heavily relied upon by the four
dissenting Justices, who advocate a rule of compensation based upon
prospective or remote use, the rule which Chandler-Dunbar had seemed
to establish when construed in its entirety.
The rule of the Twin City case will have a tremendous impact upon
future Government navigation projects. Fast lands appropriated for
navigation purposes are received by the Government at bargain prices,
since their value for compensation purposes is diminished by the burden
of the navigation servitude. The servitude burdens fast lands to the
extent of any of their value derived from the use of the stream or the
flow of the stream. Whatever value fast lands may have due to their
riparian character is an empty value as against the navigation power of
the United States. The test now appears to be quite precise and uni-
form, and its effect will undoubtedly discourage speculation and plan-
ning by private power companies along navigable streams.
LICENSES UNDER THE FEDERAL PoWER ACT
The fact that Congress may take land and structures in and along
navigable streams at minimal or no cost does not mean that it must do
so. The Federal Power Act of 192067 deserves special notice here.
Though under the act a federal licensee may build a dam in outright
violation of state law,6" full compensation is generally required from
such licensees for riparian rights appropriated from private owners."
As has been amply illustrated above, the Government itself need not
make such compensation. Licensees under the act are required to
compute and credit, from surplus earnings, "reserve payments" for the
purpose of amortizing their net investment. The purpose of such
amortization is to lessen the amount payable to them in case of appro-
priation of their facilities by the federal government. In Federal Power
Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,7 the Court held that
the Federal Power Act had not abolished private property rights under
6741 STAT. 1077 (1920), 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825 (1952).
68 First Iowa Hydro-Electric Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U.S. 152
(1946).
69 Henry Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fiber Co., 280 U.S. 369 (1930) ; United States
v. Central Stockholders' Corp., 52 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1931) (where the United States
unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin its licensee's state court action to condemn water
rights) ; accepting the law to be that FPC licensees must compensate for water rights
appropriated is Great Northern Railway Co. v. Washington Electric Co., 197 Wash.
627, 86 P2d 208 (1939).
70 347 U.S. 239 (1954) ; for a thorough discussion of the Federal Power Act and
its application to the Niagara case, see Schwartz, Water Rights Under the Federal
Power Act, 102 U. PA. L. Rav. 31 (1953).
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state law, and that expenses of the licensee for use of private proprie-
tary rights in the water of the stream were deductible in computing
surplus earnings from which amortization "reserve payments" were to
be made. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, saying that the effect of the
decision was to require the Government to pay for the use of navigable
waters:
It may be that Niagara is under a legal duty to pay for its water rights
under state law. And I agree that the Federal Power Act was not in-
tended to interfere with water rights created by state law. But it is not
true that the United States can be made to pay, directly or indirectly, for
the use of the waters of a navigable stream.... If Niagara must pay for
its water rights without being reimbursed by the United States, that is
the price Niagara must pay for its federal license.71
The quoted portion of the dissent effects an excellent reconciliation of
the act with the navigation servitude, but anticipates that possible
appropriation by the Government will be for the purpose of improving
navigation, and not under any other power. Congressional intent is
presupposed. Congress may choose to pay for the use of the waters as a
concession to its licensee.
The critical section of the act is couched in ambiguous terms. It
provides that the United States shall have the right to take over the
works of a licensee, at or after the expiration of its license, and that
compensation therefor shall be "net investment" plus severance
damages, if any:
Such net investment shall not include or be affected by the value of any
lands, rights-of-way, or other property of the United States licensed by
the Commission under this chapter, by the license or by good will, going
value or prospective revenues; nor shall the values allowed for water
rights, rights-of-way, lands, or interest in lands in excess of the actual
reasonable cost thereof at the time of acquisition by the licensee; Pro-
vided, That the right of the United States or any State or municipality
to take over, maintain, and operate any project licensed under this chap-
ter at any time by condemnation proceedings upon payment of just com-
pensation is expressly reserved.7 2
The proviso does not refer to the same measure of compensation as is
provided for a taking at or after the expiration of a license. Under the
Twin City holding, condemnation by the United States may be much
cheaper if done prior to the expiration of a license, in execution of the
navigation power. This prospect should be rather unsettling to FPC
71 Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 258
(1954).7241 STAT. 1071 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 807 (1952).
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licensees, as is the Twin City case to all other private owners of land
riparian to navigable streams.
CONCLUSION
The navigation servitude is now well defined. It is a consistent tool
for determination of property rights, which must be clearly delineated
as the first step in assessing just compensation. The Twin City decision
was predictable from the denial of access cases, and is logically con-
sistent with the servitude theory. Whether the servitude is a reasonable
outgrowth of the commerce clause may be debatable, but the Supreme
Court decisions indicate that it is here to stay.
Operations of the Government in aid of navigation ofttimes inflict serious
damage or inconvenience or interfere with advantages formerly enjoyed
by riparian owners, but damage alone gives courts no power to require
compensation where there is not an actual taking of property .... Such
losses may be compensated by legislative authority, not by force of the
Constitution alone.7 3
73 Mr. Justice Jackson in United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
510 (1945).
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